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Creating A Fast-Track Alternative Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure
Richard McMillan, Jr. *
David B. Siegel**
Many litigants are increasingly willing to experiment with new
forums for resolving their disputes. There is much interest in "al-
ternative dispute resolution" ("ADR"), as well as increasing insis-
tence on greater cost control for disputes which have to be litigated
in a more traditional manner. Overall, many litigants are develop-
ing a more progressive mind-set which requires searching for more
practical, less expensive and more effective ways of resolving litiga-
ble disputes.
Our court system has not yet developed the tools needed to
implement fully this new mind-set. ADR seeks alternatives to the
courts and has developed novel and cost-efficient ways to settle
cases short of trial. Yet ADR has been successfully implemented in
relatively few cases, leaving the vast majority of disputes to be re-
solved in traditional judicial forums.1 Similarly, while new methods
for controlling litigation costs have proven effective in certain in-
stances, these methods treat symptoms rather than causes of a
more fundamental problem. In a system which allows cases capable
of resolution in a period of months to continue for years, even the
most sophisticated cost management techniques are unlikely to pre-
vent the inevitable multiplication of the actual costs to the litigants.
What is needed, therefore, is a new option-a faster track judi-
cial system-which takes the basic principles of the ADR move-
ment, i.e., that parties can voluntarily agree to much less costly
procedures for resolving disputes if given the opportunity, and ap-
plies such principles to traditional court-supervised litigation.
Under this proposal, if codified in proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, litigants would be permitted by
mutual agreement to take a limited time and spend a limited
amount of money to prepare their cases for trial. They would then
* Partner, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1966, Princeton University;J.D.
1972, University of Minnesota; Board of Editors, MINN. L. REV., 1971-72.
** Associate, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.; B.A., M.A. 1975, University of
Pennsylvania; J.D. 1979, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 Chief Justice Burger, commenting upon the need for legislative action and judicial
innovation to enable the courts to handle their future responsibilities, noted caseloads for
the year ended June 30, 1984 increased 7.4% for the district courts and 6.2% for the courts
of appeals over the previous year. See Theuman, Current Awareness Commentary, 83 L.Ed.2d I-
J (advance sheets Jan. 28, 1985).
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be guaranteed a trial date within a set period of time, in most cases
within twelve months of filing.
I. Background
In order to appreciate the dynamics of the fast-track option, it
is necessary to examine briefly the impetus for ADR and the many
other attempts to provide alternatives to the traditional litigation
process. Like many difficult issues of public policy, the problem is
easily stated: court litigation takes too long and is too expensive.
2
The solution, however, has proven elusive.
The causes of the excessive delay and cost in the litigation pro-
cess are well known. Abuse of discovery rules, 3 misuse of pretrial
motions practice, 4 laissez faire5 judicial management,6 and insuffi-
cient judicial manpower 7 and resources8 are a few of the frequently
2 Hufstedler & Nejelski, A.B.A. Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 66
A.B.A.J. 965, 966 (1980); Janofsky, Facing the Crises of Court Costs and Delay-Initiatives for the
Bar, B. LEADERJan.-Feb. 1982, at 22. SeeJustice Powell's observation that "[l]itigation costs
have become intolerable, and they cast a lengthening shadow over the basic fairness of our
legal system." Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
3 Courts and commentators discuss widespread abuse of discovery. See, e.g., Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (Discovery is "not infrequently
exploited to the disadvantage ofjustice."); Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A
Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1304 (1978) (It is naive to expect
discovery to "resist the inroads of advanced and competitive pressures that dominate its
surroundings."); Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 264
(1979) (Abuse of the judicial process is widespread and "occurs most often in connection
with discovery.").
4 See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (assessing sanctions for violating Rule I 1 because counsel for the defendant misrep-
resented the existing state of the law); SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 102 F.R.D. 555
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (sanctions imposed on plaintiff for ill-founded motion for summary judg-
ment); Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., 101 F.R.D. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (no need to show bad
faith if there is no objective basis for the belief that a summary judgment motion was well-
founded).
5 Empirical studies reveal that when trial judges do intervene personally and assume
control over a case at an early stage of the litigation by scheduling dates for completion of
principal pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently and
with less cost and delay. S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 17-43 (1977) (Federal Judicial Center District Court Stud-
ies Series, FJC-R-77-6-1).
6 For excellent discussions of the managerial tasks of federal district court judges, see
Merritt, Owen Fiss on Paradise Lost: The Judicial Bureaucracy in the Administrative State, 92 YALE
L.J. 1469 (1983); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
7 District court caseloads continue to rise. In 1983, civil cases were filed in record
numbers in U.S. district courts as 241,842 actions were docketed. This represented a
17.3% increase over the number of cases filed in 1982 and an 85.2% increase in filings over
1976. 1983 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE AD. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 4.
8 Even a single case can generate extraordinary demands on a district court. See, e.g.,
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1980), vacating
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (The
Third Circuit, reversing a pretrial order granting ajury trial, noted that the "trial would last
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mentioned villains. Whatever the causes, however, judges, legal
scholars, and members of the bar have uniformly concluded that
court litigation can no longer serve as the preeminent method for
resolving every dispute and that other less costly methods must be
developed. Derek Bok of Harvard University recently proposed a
major restructuring of legal education to counteract what he terms
"the familiar tilt in law curriculum toward preparing students for
legal combat."9 He proposes that we turn our attention from the
courts to "new voluntary mechanisms" for resolving disputes.10
Dean Bok's call for change echoes the long-standing views of Chief
Justice Burger who has repeatedly called for increased emphasis on
alternative methods for resolving disputes,'1 and admonished the
bar to "use the inventiveness, the ingenuity, and the resourceful-
ness that have long characterized the American business and legal
community to shape new tools [to resolve disputes formerly re-
solved exclusively in the courts]."' 12 Thus, the issue today is not
merely whether there is a need to reduce reliance on formal litiga-
tion as it has been historically practiced as the dominant method for
resolving disputes; i3 rather, a separate question is how best to as-
sure cost-conscious and efficient processing of litigable disputes,
whatever the procedure or forum.
Two types of approaches have evolved over the past decade:
(1) privately sponsored dispute resolution, principally through
ADR, and (2) efforts to reform the formal litigation process through
improved management and simplified court procedures, reform of
the rules of civil procedure, and use of innovative trial techniques
in certain categories of civil cases. 14 A brief overview of each
for a full year" and that nine years of discovery had produced "millions of documents and
over 100,000 pages of depositions.").
9 Bok, A Flawed System, reprinted in 55 N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1983, at 8 (part 1), 55 N.Y. ST.
BJ., Nov. 1983, at 31, 32 (part 2).
10 Id. at 32.
11 See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Burger, Agenda for
2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 93-96 (1976) (Keynote Address
Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration ofJustice).
12 Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274, 276 (1982).
13 A recently commissioned national panel studying the problem concluded:
Society cannot and should not rely exclusively on the courts for the resolution of
disputes. Other mechanisms may be superior in a variety of controversies. They
may be less expensive, faster, less intimidating, more sensitive to disputants' con-
cerns, and more responsive to underlying problems. They may dispense better
justice, result in less alienation, produce a feeling that a dispute was actually heard,
and fulfill a need to retain control by not handing the dispute over to lawyers,
judges, and the intricacies of the legal system.
National Inst. for Dispute Resolution, Paths to Justice: Major Public Policy Issues of Dis-
pute Resolution 1 (1984) (Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolution and Public
Policy, sponsored by the U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Justice Research Program).
14 Although ADR was originally thought of as an extrajudicial process, it has been used
1985]
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follows.
A. Alternative Dispute Resolution
ADR proposals seek novel and case-specific solutions to the
psychological problems that often interfere with reasonable settle-
ments. Within this general definition are a multitude of potential
procedures intended to provide a greatly shortened version of the
trial presentation and to enhance the prospects for settlement. No
one of these methods is superior in the abstract, and each must be
specifically adapted to particular needs and particular disputes.
Successful applications of ADR have included mini-trials;' 5 infor-
mation exchanges; referrals to experts; presentations of argument,
evidence, live witnesses, affidavits, or some combination, to various
types of "neutral advisors"; binding exchanges; non-binding ex-
changes; contingent exchanges; arbitration; mediation; and almost
unlimited combinations of the foregoing.16
The strength of ADR, however, is more than the sum of these
various procedures; the key is the new mind-set which has devel-
oped among disputants who have engaged in ADR-type proceed-
ings. If parties commit themselves to the proposition that a
mutually acceptable settlement can be achieved, their ability to de-
vise procedures to enhance the accomplishment of that settlement
increases accordingly; and enhanced settlement procedures in turn
enhance settlement prospects.' 7
But while certain organizations and commentators have ac-
tively promoted the ADR movement' 8 and it has enjoyed a number
of celebrated successes,' 9 ADR has yet to have much impact on the
vast majority of disputes. There are a variety of factors which ex-
plain this, some psychological, and some logistical. Litigants often
perceive acceptance of ADR as a sort of anticipatory settlement in
in conjunction with formal court litigation at both the federal and state levels. According to
the report of the Ad Hoc Panel, "[an increasing number ofjurisdictions have established
court-annexed dispute resolution programs in which cases are referred to mediation or
non-binding arbitration before they are tried. Other courts are experimenting with innova-
tive ways to facilitate settlement." Id. at 1.
15 For an excellent example of how an ADR procedure, a non-binding "mini-trial," was
used to achieve a settlement after the parties had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars
preparing for trial and settlement offers had stagnated, see Green, Marks & Olson, Settling
Large Case Litigation: An Alternative Approach, I 1 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 493, 501-06 (1978).
16 These various approaches are discussed more fully in CENTER FOR PUBLIC RE-
SOURCES, CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (1982).
17 See Green, Marks & Olson, supra note 15, at 503-06 (example of how comprehensive
settlement procedures in turn enhance settlement prospects).
18 See Green, Reading the Landscape of ADR-The State of the Art of Extra-Judicial Forms of
Dispute Resolution, 100 F.R.D. 499, 513-20 (1983).
19 See Green, The CPR Legal Program Mini-Trial Handbook, reprinted in CENTER FOR PUBLIC
RESOURCES. CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT, MHI-126 (1982).
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which they agree prospectively to settle on as yet unknown terms. 20
Moreover, ADR may be perceived as sending an unacceptable
message of weakness to the other side. "[R]eal men don't medi-
ate" 21 is the instinctive reaction 22 of many to the ADR concept. 23
Finally, ADR imposes a much higher degree of accountability
on both lawyers and clients for the ultimate outcome of any dis-
pute. Despite the arbitrariness of many court-imposed resolutions,
there is an instant legitimacy to the simple phrase "the court or-
dered us to do it," and traditionally even the most unpalatable liti-
gation outcomes are understood and ultimately accepted on this
basis.24 Once litigants move from the judicial arena into a volun-
tary ADR forum, the built-in legitimacy of the outcome disappears
and accountability for the net results achieved increases
correspondingly. 25
In sum, ADR shows great promise and has already exerted a
major influence on the way disputes are resolved or evaluated in
this country. Nevertheless, a variety of factors-some psychological
and some related to strategic and practical considerations-make it
unlikely that ADR will divert a substantial number of cases from the
court system in the near future. It seems, therefore, that while the
ADR movement goes forward, substantial efforts must continue to
be directed toward reforming traditional court litigation in order to
halt the overall cost spiral for parties engaged in litigable disputes.
20 This problem may be further complicated by the fact that an agreement to utilize
ADR requires, in and of itself, detailed negotiations. From the range of possible proce-
dures, one set must be chosen. Parties who are not sure what they might be getting into
often cannot convince themselves up front to agree on the series of interim issues which
would make ADR a reality.
21 Comments of Edward A. Dauer, Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the
United States, 101 F.R.D. 161, 229 (1983).
22 Correspondingly, ADR lacks the capacity to satisfy a manager's desire to "get even"
or punish an opponent who caused the dispute. Often, once a dispute reaches the point
where lawyers are called in, clients adopt a personal stake in the outcome and are not really
interested in the most rational or reasoned approach. In such cases, only service of a com-
plaint seeking substantial recovery is likely to satisfy the visceral need to "win." In this
mind-set, ADR has no place.
23 A related proposition is that the dispute must be one which both parties honestly
seek to resolve. Thus, a lawsuit filed for strategic reasons (delay, cost to the other side,
etc.), to prompt legislative action, or simply to focus public attention on a particular issue,
stands little chance of successful ADR application. ADR only works where both sides have a
bonafide interest in resolving the substantive merits of a dispute. Comments of Edward A.
Dauer, supra note 2 1, at 232.
24 Comments of Edward A. Dauer, supra note 21, at 229-30.
25 ADR also deprives lawyers of the near absolute control they have long exerted over
the conduct of the dispute resolution process. Comments of Edward A. Dauer, supra note
21, at 231. In an ADR proceeding, business disputes essentially remain business problems
unencumbered by the layer of legalistic formalism which inevitably follows when a lawsuit is
filed. Managers retain proportionally more control over ADR, a phenomenon threatening
to some outside counsel.
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B. Efforts to Reform the Formal Litigation Process
Substantial efforts have already been made to reform the for-
mal litigation process. These efforts encompass a variety of strate-
gies, all aimed at streamlining the process and making it more cost-
effective in one way or another. There has been experimentation
with improved management techniques and simplified court proce-
dures, 26 as well as attempts to rationalize the process by amending
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The most recent amend-
ments to the Rules attempt to cut unnecessary cost and delay
through heightened judicial involvement and management of civil
cases,27 and through increased control over abusive tactics of law-
yers-whether by discovery,28 motions, or other written submis-
sions.29 Further, significant changes are being debated over the
extent to which the system should encourage early termination of
civil cases through the use of court-monitored settlement offers
30
26 For a recent discussion of attempts to reduce costs in the formal litigation process
through use of innovative management techniques, see Final Report of the Action Commis-
sion to Reduce Court Costs and Delay, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ATrACKING LITIGATION
COSTS AND DELAY (1984).
27 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16. Rule 16 was significantly amended in 1983 based on the
premise that more active judicial involvement over all phases of the pretrial process will
inevitably result in more effective case management. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory com-
mittee notes (1983). To this end, the amended rule requires a mandatory scheduling order
within 120 days of the filing of the complaint and encourages discussion of a wide variety of
issues at pretrial conferences. FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c). The rule contemplates that these pre-
trial conferences will fundamentally narrow the triable issues and otherwise facilitate the
expeditious resolution of the case, e.g., by serving as a forum for formulating and simplify-
ing issues, thereby avoiding unnecessary proof at trial, FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1), and identi-
fying a need for adopting special procedures for managing difficult or protracted actions.
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(10). Overall, the rule creates numerous opportunities for substantive
judicial involvement at a stage which can meaningfully streamline the litigation process.
28 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26. The rule "is designed to encourage district judges to identify
instances of needless discovery and to limit the use of various discovery devices accord-
ingly." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee notes (1983). Rule 26 also provides added
sanctions for those who abuse the discovery rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
29 See FED. R. Civ. P. 7, 11. Rules 7 and 11 have been amended to impose a duty of
reasonable inquiry on those who file any motion, pleading or other paper. Rule 11 sets out
a duty of reasonable inquiry designed to "reduce frivolous claims, defenses or motions by
leading litigants to stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing pa-
pers." COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENTS TO
THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, H.R. Doc. No. 54, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1983) [hereinafter cited as AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE]. Rule 11 also mandates sanctions for violations in an effort to provide a healthy
deterrent to costly, meritless maneuvers.
30 See proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68, 102 F.R.D. 432 (1984). Substantial debate is ongo-
ing on a proposed amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 68, a rule designed to encourage serious
consideration of settlement offers, but which, as currently constituted, is thought to be
largely ineffectual. See 102 F.R.D. at 432-37 (advisory committee notes). Under the pro-
posed rule, any party could make an offer of settlement. If the offer is rejected and the
court finds upon consideration of a post-trial motion that rejection of the offer was unrea-
sonable, resulting in unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost of the litigation
after taking into account all relevant circumstances at the time of the rejection, then the
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and preliminary debate is ongoing regarding the conduct of class
action litigation.3 a Finally, federal courts are increasingly integrat-
ing certain ADR techniques in the formal court procedures.3 2 Sum-
mary jury trials,3 3 mandatory mediation 34 and mandatory
arbitration3 5 are now part of the federal court landscape.
All these changes seek to make the system more cost-efficient
and give litigants a chance to secure a final resolution in a more
timely fashion by eliminating abuses which historically have caused
delay. Yet most of these changes, however laudatory, rely on the
court system's ability to make good on the commitments of legisla-
tors or judicially promulgated rules. Because of large differences in
docket size, judicial manpower and expertise, complexity of
caseload and a variety of other variables, litigants often still find
themselves in court systems generally unresponsive to cost,36 and
the useful innovations which have been made are often limited to a
handful ofjurisdictions.3 7 Moreover, the effectiveness of any inno-
vation is all too often a function of the management skill and com-
mitment of the particular judge to whom the case is assigned or the
capacity of the particular jurisdiction in which the dispute is filed to
carry out the mandates of a specific rule or procedure.
These problems cannot be solved merely by asking our judicial
system to "try harder." Recent amendments to the Federal Rules
have tended to fall short because they merely permit rather than
require better case management by judges.38 Judges have been too
court could impose an appropriate sanction upon the offeree, including award of attorney's
fees.
31 See Major Changes in Rule 23 Urged by Special Committee, LITIGATION NEWS, Fall 1984, at
1.
32 See The New ADR Rules in the Western District of Michigan, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LITIGATION, Oct. 1984, at 10. For example, W.D. MICH. R. 41 provides in perti-
nent part as follows: "TheJudges of this District favor initiation of alternative formulas for
resolving diputes, saving costs and time, and permitting the parties to utilize creativity in
fashioning non-coercive settlements .. " Id. at 11.
33 See W.D. MICH. R. 44. For a thoughtful discussion of summary jury triaL, see T.
LAMBROS, THE SUMMARYJURY TRIAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION, (rev. ed. Oct. 1984) (A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System).
34 See W.D. MICH. R. 42.
35 See E.D. PA. R. 8; Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way, 69 A.B.A. J. 64
(1983).
36 See note 2 supra.
37 Fast-track treatment is available in certain jurisdictions when particularly innovative
local rules are combined with outstanding judicial managers. In the Eastern District of
Virginia, for example, Judge Albert Bryant has provided litigants with institutionalized fast-
track treatment for many years. The local rules severely limit the discovery options of both
parties, see, e.g., E.D. VA. R. 11-1 (A) (limiting both parties to 30 written interrogatories), 11-
I(b) (limiting both parties to five depositions), and when these limitations are combined
withJudge Bryant's rigorous adherence to pretrial timetables, litigants are virtually guaran-
teed a fast and cost-efficient resolution.
38 The one exception to this is FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b) which requires the district judge,
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easily diverted from exercising their new discretionary authority. 39
As a result, quicker and cheaper justice continues to be dispensed
erratically, if at all, in many jurisdictions. This is an institutional
problem, which no amount of well-intentioned exhortation is likely
to correct.
C. The Need For a New Option-A Fast-Track Under the Federal Rules
A middle ground exists between alternative dispute resolution
and the various strategies for reforming traditional litigation which
to date remains substantially unexplored. ADR posits much more
rapid disposition of cases, but eschews using courts to accomplish
that objective. Judicial reformers tend (at least tacitly) to envision
cases moving on a more traditional timetable, but hope the cases
can be "better" managed and shortened somewhat using reformed
procedures. Most cases, however, fall in the gap between these two
approaches. For a substantial number of litigants, ADR is not prac-
tically achievable, and traditional litigation, however "improved," is
still much too expensive and too time-consuming. Ourjudicial sys-
tem has yet to posit a one year solution for the three year case.
There should be a workable alternative. Our court system
must offer a new option: a fast-track option which merges the goals
of ADR with necessary changes in court rules to make those goals
achievable within the context of our existing judicial system. Liti-
gants must, in short, be permitted to resolve their disputes in court
not just a little faster, but many times faster than the current system
allows. As discussed in Part II, this article contends that a not too
radical adjustment to traditional court procedures can accomplish
this radical result.
Permitting litigants to pursue truly fast-track litigation might
yield results comparable to ADR. Like ADR, the parties would re-
solve their disputes rapidly, cost-effectively and without the typical
war of attrition. Fast-track court litigation, however, would not nec-
essarily be burdened by the drawbacks of ADR.40 Litigants need
within 120 days after filing of the complaint, to enter a mandatory scheduling order regard-
ing joinder, motions practice, completion of discovery or other matters deemed appropri-
ate by the court.
39 See, e.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D.
199, 203 (1976) (Address delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice). Kirkham, discussing the problem of
controlling discovery in complex civil litigation, stated: "Judges throw up their hands and
ask how they can examine a million documents and say whether they are relevant, and the
problem is all too often solved by simply giving plaintiffs access to all of defendant's files
and records, relevant and irrelevant."
40 Moreover, in contrast to ADR, the proposal would be free to litigants. Because the
fast-track option operates within the structure of the existing court system, no additional
fees would have to be expended to pay neutral advisors, mediators, or arbitrators.
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not commit initially to any willingness to compromise; they are
promised their day in court. They need not negotiate the proce-
dures by which that compromise will be achieved; judicial rules are
already in place. Finally, the parties need not overcome psycholog-
ical hurdles of agreeing prospectively to an "acceptable" resolution
because they will obtain a verdict if they choose to litigate the case
to a conclusion. Once on a fast-track, however, they could achieve
that verdict in a compressed time frame at a much reduced cost.
What should be the characteristics of an acceptable fast-track
option? There are many possibilities, and Part II of this article pro-
poses a specific solution. Whatever the specific approach, any
workable fast-track option must have, at a minimum, the following
attributes.
1. It must be faster.
In a very real sense, the ills of our present litigation system are
attributable to the simple phenomenon that if a lawyer is given five
years to do everything he can to win his case, he will think of five
years' worth of activity to improve the chances. The fallacy in this
approach is that the outcome probably would not change much if
the same case were completed in three years or one year. Only the
level of ultimately nondispositive detail would be altered.
The solution seems all too obvious: litigation deadlines must
be shortened. If parties can agree, for example, on discovery cutoff
six months from the date the suit is initiated, our judicial system
should not stand in the way of the substantial time and cost savings
which such an approach can achieve. Establishing hard, fast, and
speedy case management deadlines will have a tremendous impact
on the management of cases.4 1 Parties could no longer litigate for
"as long as it takes." Rather, there would be a structure which re-
quired all parties to evaluate their case, set priorities, and adopt the
best litigation strategy which could be accomplished in the time
available.
42
41 The effectiveness of strict time limits in expediting the processing of civil cases is
well established. The National Commission for Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures
found that "in districts having strong time controls, cases were resolved as much as 50%0
faster than similar actions in other districts with weaker controls." REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF ANTrrruST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 28 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ANTITRUST COMMISSION REPORT].
42 The Antitrust Commission Report specifically acknowledged the effectiveness of this
approach in finding that:
The value of time limits lies in their simplicity and their capacity to stimulate liti-
gants to narrow the areas of inquiry and advocacy to those they believe are truly
relevant and material. Time limits not only compress the amount of resources
invested in litigation. Litigants are forced to establish discovery priorities and thus
to do the most important work first.
ANTITRUST COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 41, at 28.
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2. There must be incentives to make the system work.
Could our judicial system continue to work if it were suddenly
required that all cases proceed three times as quickly? Probably
not, unless federal legislators provided many additional judgeships
and courthouses to manage the increased workload. As this seems
unlikely, alternative solutions must be found. One possibility is to
permit litigants to elect a fast-track strategy. In exchange, those
making such an election could be required to assent to precondi-
tions that would make it painful to engage in activities that might
interfere with the fast-track approach. Because of these penalties
and other reasons, only a percentage of litigants would make the
fast-track election, so that the system would be burdened only to
that extent. Moreover, once the election was made, the appropriate
penalty provisions would ensure greater cooperation of the parties
in meeting the fast-track schedule without imposing excessive de-
mands on the judiciary.
3. It must be compatible with management of the existing
docket.
To ensure that the fast-track option does not overburden the
judiciary or otherwise interfere with effective case management, ul-
timate authority over use of accelerated procedures must reside
with the trial judge. Thus, the fast-track option must provide trial
judges with the option, to be exercised within relatively narrow lim-
its; to consider overall docket management needs prior to sanction-
ing expedited treatment. Similarly, setting the specific trial date
must ultimately be at the court's discretion, although boundaries
on that discretion might be established.
4. It must be universally available to all litigants.
Litigants today are faced with wide disparities among the hun-
dreds of court systems operating throughout this country. Some
courts have made truly innovative use of cost-cutting procedures, 43
utilized the expanded opportunities provided by the Federal Rules
to manage litigation,44 and experimented regularly with new tech-
niques for increasing the efficiency of the litigation process. Other
courts, however, have made little progress in streamlining the con-
duct of litigation, and parties forced to prosecute or defend in these
jurisdictions quickly realize that they have little or no control over
the litigation process. Any proposed amendment must therefore be
universally applied and must fundamentally establish the right of
fast-track litigants to expedited results not entirely dependent on
43 See note 26 supra.
44 See notes 27-29 supra.
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the skill of any particular judge or efficiency of any particular court
system.
II. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
The premise for the amendments proposed in this article is
that some institutionalization of the fast-track option-institutional-
ization which does not depend entirely on the skill, good inten-
tions, time availability and cooperative spirit of the lawyers, judges
and clients involved-is essential if accelerated case management is
to become a reality. This article proposes that institutionalizing the
fast-track option be accomplished by four specific amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These are set forth in full text
in the Appendix. Three new subsections to Rule 16 are proposed,
under which the parties, by stipulation, can elect to proceed on an
accelerated schedule, with trial guaranteed within twelve months.
The Rule 16 amendments also provide mechanisms to ensure that
accelerated processing does not interfere with effective manage-
ment of the balance of the district court docket. These amend-
ments permit appropriate judicial control over exercise of the fast-
track option and create strong incentives for a reduced motions
practice to prevent unnecessary delay in the system or increased
burdens on the judiciary. A fourth amendment, to Rule 37, is
designed to reduce discovery disputes by imposing mandatory
sanctions on the losing party to any such dispute.
These carefully balanced proposals would represent a major
step forward in reform of this area. The new fast-track option
would save both time and money for litigants who selected it. It
would also include sanctions and safeguards both to ensure the
continued cooperation of the parties and to protect judges from the
increased burdens which accelerated case management might
otherwise impose. The expectation is that, on the average, the
overall burden on the judiciary would actually decrease as cases set-
tle faster and dockets are correspondingly reduced.
A. Proposed Rule 16(f)-Election Of Accelerated Procedures
A new Rule 16(f) would establish the basic ground rules for
the fast-track election:
16(f) Election Of Accelerated Procedures
Upon stipulation of all parties filed in any action within 20 days
after filing of answers to the complaint, the court as provided in
the stipulation shall order accelerated scheduling of such action,
set a date for completion of all discovery, set an approximate
trial date, and make such other scheduling orders as the parties
may suggest. The trial date shall be no later than 12 months
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from the date of the stipulation. The election of accelerated
procedures pursuant to this section may not be withdrawn ex-
cept by order of the court for good cause shown.
Under proposed Rule 16(f), the choice of a fast-track option is
by election of the parties. To trigger accelerated procedures, all
parties must agree by stipulation to at least two deadlines: a discov-
ery cutoff and a recommended trial date. The stipulation may also
contain any additional scheduling deadlines to which the parties
agree. Subject to court approval of the stipulation under Rule
16(g) (discussed below), accelerated procedures would be imple-
mented automatically and trial would be guaranteed within twelve
months of the stipulation. Once accelerated procedures are
elected, however, the parties could not withdraw the election ex-
cept for good cause shown.
1. Stipulating to Accelerated Procedures
The election of accelerated procedures could theoretically be
accomplished in either of two ways: by order of the court over the
opposition of one or more parties, or by agreement of the parties.
Court-ordered acceleration poses various difficulties. First, acceler-
ated procedures should not be a vehicle for permitting one party to
achieve mere tactical advantage. If one party could force another to
accept accelerated procedures by filing a motion with the court,
there is substantial risk that the moving party's motivation would be
unrelated to the efficiency and cost saving principles that underlie
the fast-track approach. Courts are not equipped at the outset of
litigation to assess accurately where the tactical advantages might
lie. Accordingly, judicially-ordered accelerated procedures create
some risk of unfairness.
Second, court-ordered accelerated procedures might not prove
workable over the opposition of parties to the case. It certainly
would not work without imposing substantial burdens on the judici-
ary. If dispute after dispute reaches the court, or motion after mo-
tion is filed, this burden could become quite substantial.
Third, completing discovery and pretrial tasks within twelve
months will not be possible, in many cases, unless both parties to
the litigation limit their discovery and motions practice to some ex-
tent. In a sense, the parties give up their right to avail themselves
of the full panoply of procedural options available under the cur-
rent rules in exchange for the opportunity to secure the cost and
time economies associated with accelerated processing under the
proposed rules.
Accordingly, proposed Rule 16(f) cannot be implemented
without agreement of all parties. Such agreement presumably will
not be reached unless the tactical advantages of accelerated proce-
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dures are roughly equal among the parties, or the benefits of accel-
erated procedures are viewed as sufficiently attractive to justify
certain tactical risks.45 Requiring stipulated election provides
greater assurance that when the inevitable difficulties arise during
the course of the litigation, cooperative solutions can be achieved
without increasing the overall burden on the judiciary. 46
2. Timing: Within Twenty Days of the Answer
The proposed rule permits the parties to file their stipulation
seeking accelerated procedures within twenty days of answering the
complaint. Because the answer date in many cases is or can be rou-
tinely extended for a reasonable time, tying the stipulation to the
answer date provides some degree of flexibility. If the parties wish
to have more detailed discussion of the utility of accelerated proce-
dures or negotiate the provisions of the stipulation, they need only
extend the answer date.4
7
Moreover, because the stipulation need not be filed until after
the answer is filed, the parties will have notice of counterclaims,
cross-claims, and third-party claims asserted at the time of stipula-
tion. This is important, because if substantially new claims could be
added without prior notice to the stipulating parties, there would
be considerable potential for unfairness to parties surprised by the
new complexion of the case.48 The proposed procedure therefore
ensures more informed ratification of the stipulation.
45 In cases with multiple parties, stipulations of "all parties" may be particularly diffi-
cult. On the other hand, accelerated procedures in multiple party cases will be particularly
difficult to achieve if all parties do not support the concept of accelerated procedures. Ac-
cordingly, the proposed rule requires that all parties, rather than some smaller subset of
parties, stipulate to accelerated procedures.
46 It is difficult to predict the sorts of litigants who might find accelerated procedures
most attractive. It does seem probable that a number of companies with frequent litigation
problems, which are already chafing at the increasing costs and delays of the current sys-
tem, would find accelerated procedures attractive. In particular, a number of companies
have signed the so-called "ADR Pledge," committing the company to investigate alternative
dispute resolution in all cases. Companies as diverse as A T & T, Chrysler, Eli Lilly, Good-
year, J.C. Penney, Standard Oil of California, Union Carbide, and Westinghouse have
signed the pledge. See Barnette, The Importance of Alternative Dispute Resoluton: Reducing Liti-
gation Costs as a Corporate Objective, 53 ANTrrusT LJ. 277, 280 (1984). A similar pledge to
consider accelerated procedures whenever possible might be attractive to some companies
under the new proposed rules.
47 In addition, there may be delays in retention of counsel or, once retained, delays in
counsel's ability to evaluate the applicable facts and law in the case. In cases involving
multiple parties, the mechanics of reaching agreement on a stipulation for accelerated pro-
cedures might be cumbersome. Accordingly, the parties have greater flexibility if the time
for the stipulation is keyed to the answer date.
48 Although it is possible that other parties or claims might be added when responsive
pleadings are filed to third-party claims, cross-claims or counterclaims, the initial answer
date should trigger the stipulation. On balance, the parties will be on notice at this point as
to the general contours of the litigation, i.e., whether it is a simple two-party action, or
whether counterclaims will be asserted. Waiting until all possible issues and parties are
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As currently drafted, the proposed rule requires the stipulation
to be filed after the answer, even if the answer date has been sub-
stantially delayed by the filing of Rule 12 motions. This creates
some potential for delay, but is necessary for two reasons. First, the
parties will not be aware of counterclaims, cross-claims and third-
party claims until the answer is filed. Second, Rule 12 motions in-
volving issues of process, jurisdiction or other inadequacies in
pleadings may need to be resolved, as a practical matter, before the
parties are prepared to stipulate to accelerated processing of the
litigation on the merits.49 Thus, the parties should be permitted to
resolve those issues prior to filing the stipulation and to avail them-
selves of additional time for considering the stipulation in cases
where Rule 12 motions are filed.50
On the other hand, permitting the parties to file a stipulation
for accelerated procedures at any stage in the proceeding would
not be appropriate. Such an approach would create a risk that the
parties would use the rule merely to manipulate the court's sched-
ule when the case was being readied for trial. In addition, the im-
pact of such a procedure on the court's ability to manage the
balance of its docket would be untenable. Finally, parties who are
unwilling to stipulate to accelerated procedures at a relatively early
stage in the proceedings are not demonstrating the interest in ac-
celerated procedures which is an appropriate predicate for trigger-
ing those procedures. Accordingly, unless the election is made
near the outset of the case-or at least once it is clear that the case
will require a "merits" resolution-accelerated procedures would
not be available under the proposed rule.
3. Contents of the Stipulation
The proposed rule requires that the parties stipulate to a dis-
covery cutoff date, recommend an approximate trial date no later
than twelve months from the date of stipulation, and suggest other
scheduling orders as the parties deem appropriate. The discovery
cutoff is probably the most essential element in the scheduling pro-
cess. The parties are permitted to set any date upon which they
joined is unnecessary in most cases and would build in an unacceptable potential for sub-
stantial delay.
49 Parties who believe that they will use expedited procedures if dispositive Rule 12
motions are denied could advise the court of such intention and request expeditious resolu-
tion of such motions and interim relief from any standing orders or local rules of procedure
which would impose burdens on the litigants inconsistent with fast-track processing.
50 For similar reasons, requiring the stipulation within a set time period, such as 60 or
90 days from service of the complaint, is inappropriate. While such an approach places
finite limits on possible delays and has the advantage of certainty, it lacks the flexibility to
accommodate cases involving Rule 12 motions or delayed answers, counterclaims, cross-
claims or third-party claims.
[Vol. 60:431
FAST-TRACK LITIGATION
agree. The more accelerated and foreshortened discovery they are
prepared to accept, the earlier the discovery cutoff they may
choose. Once set, the expedited discovery cutoff ordinarily has the
beneficial effect of ensuring that the case proceeds expeditiously
toward trial or informal resolution5
1
The stipulation should also recommend a trial date. This sec-
ond crucial scheduling deadline is essential to permit the parties to
focus on completing necessary pretrial tasks other than discovery.
While a final trial date will necessarily depend on the court's calen-
dar, the rule anticipates that most courts would attempt to set a
date in roughly the time frame recommended by the stipulation for
accelerated procedures.
Finally, proposed Rule 16(f) contemplates that the parties may
include in the stipulation "such other scheduling orders" as they
may deem appropriate. This provision permits the parties to estab-
lish interim deadlines for discovery or other pretrial tasks. Some
interim scheduling will probably be desirable in all but the most
unusual cases. Accordingly, the parties, if they choose, may include
in the stipulation further scheduling provisions dealing with pro-
duction of documents, depositions, exchange of witness and exhibit
lists and other matters which, if scheduled properly, may improve
the expeditious handling of the case.52
4. The Twelve Month Trial Date
Proposed Rule 16(f) provides that, subject to modifications
under proposed Rule 16(g) to accommodate the court's calendar,
trial must be scheduled within twelve months of submitting the
stipulation. This mandatory requirement cannot be varied except
by the procedures in proposed Rule 16(g).
A mandatory twelve month deadline accomplishes a number of
purposes. First, it defines the contours of the fast-track option. If
51 The report of the Advisory Committee to the newly promulgated amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognized, in an analogous situation, the crucial impor-
tance of an early and expeditious issuance of a scheduling order to the overall management
of a district judge's docket: "Based on empirical studies our Committee is satisfied that
early intervention and management by a judge is important to the prompt and efficient
movement and disposition of litigation on his calendar . . . including the power, with
knowledge of his trial calendar, to fix deadlines for motions, completion of discovery and
trial... ." AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 29, at 3. See also
Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, Iowa, 710 F.2d 455, 463 (8th Cir. 1983) ("In almost all
cases the key to avoiding excessive costs and delay is early and stringent judicial manage-
.nent of the case.").
52 For example, in cases involving substantial numbers of documents, it may be essen-
tial that the parties agree on an early date for mutual and complete exchange of documents.
If such a date were missed, it might prove practically infeasible to meet subsequent dead-
lines, including the discovery cutoff deadline. Moreover, including such dates in certain
cases might reassure the court of the practical feasibility of the parties' fast-track election.
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the parties believe they can complete the case in less than twelve
months, they are free to establish a quicker schedule. On the other
hand, if the parties are unwilling to compress their litigation activity
into at least a twelve month time frame, then one of two things
seems likely: either the parties lack the desire or determination to
make the sacrifices necessary to achieve accelerated case manage-
ment, or the case is of such magnitude that completing trial and
pretrial within twelve months is not really feasible. In the latter in-
stance, it seems desirable to permit alternative forms of case man-
agement which can be fashioned under existing Rule 16.
5 3
5. Withdrawal of Stipulation on Good Cause Shown
Once the court accepts the stipulation for accelerated proce-
dures, it may not be withdrawn except by order of the court for
good cause shown. As the accelerated litigation proceeds, it is fore-
seeable in some cases that the party whose case is suffering the
most may attempt to decelerate the litigation or otherwise impede
the progress of the opposing parties. This should ordinarily not be
permitted. 54 The use of accelerated procedures should not degen-
erate into a tactical battle; the parties should understand from the
outset that once they commit to accelerated procedures, they will
be bound by that commitment.
The provision of Rule 16(f) preventing voluntary withdrawal
of the stipulation is similar in purpose to the provisions of pro-
posed Rules 16(h) and 37(h), which limit motions practice and im-
pose sanctions for unnecessary discovery disputes. All three
53 For example, large cases typically require sophisticated management schemes.
Under newly promulgated Rule 16(c)(10), the district court is to consider "the need for
adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that
may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions or unusual proof
problems." Guidelines for the management of large cases are already available in the MAN-
UAL FOR COMPLEX LrrIGATION (1982), and other sources. Thus, in cases which cannot be
compressed within a 12 month time frame, it seems desirable to rely on the existing frame-
work of Rule 16 procedure.
54 The "good cause" standard for withdrawing a stipulation is somewhat analogous to
the standard governing voluntary dismissals pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Both seek
to articulate a standard of review for district court evaluation of a litigant's request to
change litigation directions. Under Rule 41 (a)(2), in deciding whether to permit voluntary
dismissal, the court has the power to weigh the equities and do justice in each case, see Cone
v. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947), but should grant plaintiff's request
"unless the defendant will suffer some legal harm." LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d
601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976). The "good cause" standard of proposed Rule 16() anticipates
that the district judge will view requests to withdraw on a somewhat more critical basis. In
order for the fast-track system to succeed, the overriding presumption must remain that
parties are bound by their stipulation, absent circumstances which could not reasonably
have been anticipated at the time of execution. Thus, some fundamental change in the
posture of the case might justify a finding of good cause. The burden of the party seeking
withdrawal, however, would be to demonstrate why the particular "fundamental change" at
issue could not have been anticipated at the time the stipulation was filed.
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provisions are designed to indicate clearly to litigants that acceler-
ated procedures involve some potential hardship. Parties unwilling
to sacrifice some of their traditional rights and remedies under the
existing rules to secure litigation economies may not wish to utilize
the fast-track option. Those who elect accelerated procedures will
be required to exercise litigating discipline and will be forewarned
of the risks they face if they fail in that responsibility.
B. Proposed Rule 16(g)-Grounds For Denial Of Accelerated Procedures
Proposed Rule 16(g) defines the supervisory role which the
court must play in connection with accelerated procedures. New
Rule 16(g) would provide as follows:
16(g) Grounds For Denial Of Accelerated Procedures
The court may reject a stipulated election of accelerated proce-
dures only if the court finds that (i) the court's docket cannot
reasonably accommodate such accelerated procedures, or (ii)
the action is too complex to be suited to accelerated procedures
or can be better managed in other ways. Denial of accelerated
procedures under this subsection shall only be made within 30
days of filing of the stipulation, after full hearing.
Rule 16 (g) in effect permits the court to exercise veto authority
over the parties' stipulated election of accelerated procedures.
Although the rule anticipates that this authority will be used spar-
ingly and that courts will generally honor the parties' election, the
grounds upon which the court may reject the stipulation are ex-
pressed in broad terms to allow each judge the flexibility to re-
spond to the exigencies of the case and his docket. Rejection, if it
occurs, must be within thirty days of filing of the stipulation and can
only be made after full hearing. These procedural requirements
further emphasize the rule's primary intent-that judges exercise
this veto authority conservatively.
1. Rejection on Grounds of Incompatibility with the Court's
Docket
The first basis on which accelerated procedures may be denied
is incompatibility with the court's docket. The degree of incompati-
bility will vary both as a function of the specific jurisdiction and
judge involved, and as a function of the particular schedule sug-
gested by the parties' stipulation.
Some jurisdictions or judges have heavy criminal dockets and,
because of the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 55 ex-
55 The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1982), provides specific time limits
for the initial stages in the federal criminal process, enforceable by dismissal of the indict-
ment. In addition, the courts are empowered to sanction prosecutors and defense attor-
neys for deliberate dilatory tactics by imposing fines, suspension, forfeiture of a percentage
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pedited treatment of civil cases may not be feasible. Some judges
already will be committed to extended trials in complex cases dur-
ing the period selected by the parties in an accelerated case. In
either instance, it may be impossible to accommodate the proposed
acceleration of a particular case.
Accommodation with the court's docket would likely be most
difficult when the schedule suggested by the parties is most com-
pressed. Parties seeking a trial date within six months may be less
likely to succeed than parties seeking a trial date within twelve
months. Rather than rejecting the stipulation completely, the court
would have discretion to deny the early trial date in favor of a sub-
sequent trial date still within the twelve month time frame.
56
2. Rejection Based on Type of Case
A second ground for denial of accelerated procedures is a find-
ing by the court that the action is too complex or can otherwise be
managed in better ways. Some actions are so complex that no mat-
ter how determined the parties might be, compression of the case
into something less than twelve months would either not be practi-
cable or would require such constant attention by the court as to be
unreasonably burdensome. Large antitrust cases, 57 multiparty
commercial disputes and class actions 8 may fit this description in
particular instances.5 9
of compensation (in this case of defense attorneys) and other disciplinary measures. See
Frose, Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. CI. L. REV. 667 (1976) (exhaustive treatment of the
subject).
The Speedy Trial Act, however, has not caused the disruption some judges and com-
mentators feared at the time of its enactment. See Speedy TrialAct of 1974: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 4807, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1974) (testimony of Hon. John Feikens, Judge, U.S. District Court,
Eastern District of Michigan). Two recent studies of the Act's impact on civil litigation in
district court suggested that the Act has had little independent effect on the flow or volume
of civil litigation. N. Ames, K. Carson, T. Hammett & G. Kennington, The Processing of
Federal Criminal Cases Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (as amended 1979), at 102-18
(1980) (FederalJustice Research Program, FJRP-80/002); Ad. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Imple-
mentation of Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, C1-C16 (Sept. 30, 1980).
56 In particular cases, even a recommended trial date 12 months in the future might
conflict with some previously scheduled trial date in another case. This might require re-
jection of the stipulation, or modification to permit an even more accelerated schedule.
57 For a useful treatment of the problems associated with expediting antitrust trials, see
ABA Antitrust Section, Expediting Pretrials and Trials of Antitrust Cases (Monograph No. 3,
1979).
58 Provisions amending Rule 23 have recently been recommended in an effort to make
the class action device more useful and manageable. See LITIGATION NEws, supra note 31, at
1.
59 In order to avoid rejection of a stipulation in a complex case, the parties could set
forth in the stipulation interim procedures to reassure the court that the case would be
manageable within the recommended time frame. For example, the parties might agree in
the stipulation that each party be limited to a maximum number of depositions which could
be accommodated within the suggested schedule.
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Even if a case is not too complex technically, the court may find
that it would be better managed in ways other than accelerated pro-
cedures. The standard-whether it can "be better managed in
other ways" -is intentionally somewhat general. The court's dis-
cretion is restrained in only one way: the court must have in mind
and be willing to implement a "better" way of managing the case
than the accelerated procedures proposed by the parties. Although
the generality of this guideline creates uncertainty for the litigants,
it would be difficult to set forth more rigid criteria applicable to the
great range of cases to which this rule would be applied.
3. Denial After Fixed Time Period Based on Full Hearing
Notwithstanding the somewhat flexible substantive standards
by which the court may evaluate a stipulation for accelerated proce-
dures, denial of the stipulation is subject to significant procedural
restrictions. In addition to the rule's generalized presumption in
favor of allowing accelerated procedures, these procedural require-
ments should help ensure that denial of the stipulation occurs in
only a limited number of cases.
Proposed Rule 16(g) requires that denial be made only after
some appropriate hearing. 60 In addition, the denial must occur
within thirty days of filing the stipulation. This should ensure that
the parties are notified quickly if their stipulation is to be denied
and reduce the reliance factor in those cases where the stipulation
to accelerated procedures has involved the commitment by one or
more parties to a heavy allocation of resources in the particular
case.6 1
C. Proposed Rule 16(h)-Limited Motions Practice
Proposed Rule 16(h) and proposed Rule 37(h) (discussed be-
low) are designed to deal with different aspects of the need to en-
sure limited reliance on the courts to resolve pretrial disputes that
may arise during accelerated procedures. Rule 16(h), perhaps the
most controversial of the proposals, would provide as follows:
16(h) Accelerated Procedures-Limited Motions Practice
60 The precise nature of the required hearing is not defined and is subject to the rea-
sonable discretion of the trial judge. This is consistent with the approach used in other
rules. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
61 In drafting proposed Rule 16(g), a statement that denial of a stipulation could only
be made in "extraordinary circumstances," or some similar provision was considered.
There were various problems with this approach. "Extraordinary circumstances" might
prove difficult to define. It seemed inadvisable, given the range of different cases which
might confront the courts, to so severely limit the discretion of the courts in denying accel-
erated procedures. Finally, in view of the procedural restrictions, it seemed unlikely that
additional restrictions would be necessary to ensure meaningful compliance with the goal
of denying accelerated procedures in only limited cases.
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Parties who elect accelerated procedures shall restrict to the ex-
tent possible the filing of pretrial motions with the court. If any
party filing more than one pretrial motion (other than a Rule
37(a) motion to compel) does not substantially prevail in any
such motion, the court may order such party, after opportunity
for hearing, to pay to the opposing party the reasonable ex-
penses, including attorney's fees, incurred in opposing such
motion.
Rule 16(h) does not cover discovery motions, which are ad-
dressed by proposed Rule 37(h). It does cover every other kind of
pretrial motion, from routine motions for time extension to mo-
tions for summary judgment. Parties are urged to restrict the use
of such nondiscovery motions and are subject to sanctions if they
use such motions too frequently and unsuccessfully.
1. Limiting Motions Practice to the Extent Possible
The first sentence of Rule 16(h) sets forth the goal of this
rule-to restrict pretrial motions to the extent possible. This gen-
eral statement of purpose is intended to make the objective explicit
in the rule. In addition, parties who violate the spirit of this provi-
sion are put on express notice and will have fewer grounds for com-
plaint if they are subsequently disciplined by the court for excessive
use of pretrial motions.
62
2. Applicability to any Pretrial Motion
With the exception of discovery motions covered by proposed
Rule 37(h), Rule 16(h) would apply to any type of pretrial motion-
long or short, substantive or procedural, simple or complex. The
rule allows each party only one such motion; the filing of subse-
quent motions, if unsuccessful, subjects the party to payment of
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, at the court's
discretion.
At first blush, it seems somewhat draconian to treat a simple
motion for time extension in the same vein as more complex sub-
stantive motions. On the other hand, simple motions for time ex-
tensions are precisely the sort of matter which the parties should be
able to resolve themselves if accelerated procedures are to work ef-
fectively. Moreover, simpler motions expose the moving party only
to the presumably more modest costs necessary to oppose the mo-
tion. Accordingly, there are good reasons for considering all pre-
trial motions the same for purposes of this rule.
62 This might include not only an award of attorney's fees as provided in Rule 16(h) but
other disciplinary sanctions, in the form of restricted procedural rights or otherwise, which
the court in its inherent power to manage the litigation might impose. See United States v.
Hudson, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812 .
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The proposed rule ultimately does not distinguish between
complex and simple motions because imposing rigid limits on pre-
trial motions practice in accelerated cases is of such overriding im-
portance. Under existing procedures, litigation schedules are
regularly scuttled by overuse of motions. The briefing process can
be time-consuming; the burden on the court can be substantial; and
some judges simply cannot be relied upon to rule promptly on
pending motions. Accordingly, the substantial use of pretrial mo-
tions could seriously undercut the workability of the accelerated
procedures device.
Because the rule is a rigid one, arbitrarily permitting only one
motion without threat of sanctions, the rule is open to potential
abuses. Parties may entice the opposition to use up its free motion
on unimportant issues. Alternatively, a party may save all pretrial
issues for inclusion in one massive pretrial motion. The latter
problem can be controlled effectively by the court,63 and the former
problem, though perhaps inevitable, does not seem of sufficient
concern to change the rule.64
3. Grounds for Awarding Costs
Certain requirements must be fulfilled for sanctions to be avail-
able under Rule 16(h). First, the party against whom sanctions are
sought must have filed at least one prior nondiscovery pretrial mo-
tion. For the first pretrial motion, the party is not subject to pay-
ment of any costs. For the second and any succeeding motion-
regardless of whether the party prevailed on his first motion-the
party may be ordered to pay the reasonable expenses if he does not
"substantially prevail."
Second, in light of the potential for unfairness in this rule,
granting costs is discretionary with the court.65 Multiple pretrial
motions may be unavoidable and, in fact, may be desirable in some
cases.66 Novel issues may arise during the course of a proceeding
63 For example, the court, either on its own initiative or at the suggestion of one party,
could establish limits on the timing or length of motions that the court would be prepared
to consider. This might preclude the filing of omnibus motions raising many unrelated
issues.
64 Hopefully, most parties who had been able to agree on accelerated procedures
would be prepared to use good faith to comply with those procedures. If tactical opportu-
nities did arise they would hopefully be the same for both parties, i.e., more than one party
could play the game of trying to force the opposition into needless motions practice. In
light of these opportunities, both parties in the interest of the more paramount objective of
accelerated procedures, have some incentive to avoid needless pretrial motions.
65 If the party did prevail in his first motion, this would certainly be a discretionary
factor which the court might consider in evaluating whether to award costs and fees for a
subsequent motion.
66 In certain cases pretrial motions may be the most expeditious and cost-effective way
of resolving a dispute.
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which neither party could foresee and which require the court's gui-
dance, or the court may sense that one party's motions practice is
the result of tactical maneuvering by the other party. In these
cases, the court may decline to award costs and attorney's fees. In
any event, costs and fees may be awarded only after opportunity for
hearing.6
7
4. "Reasonable" Expenses, Including Attorney's Fees
Because awarding attorney's fees under proposed Rules 16(h)
and 37(h) might occur with greater frequency than in nonacceler-
ated litigation, the courts should pay particular attention to the rea-
sonableness of the requested fee. In this regard, it might be
desirable at the outset to establish fixed hourly rates applicable to
attorneys for both parties for purposes of Rule 16(h) or 37(h) mo-
tions. This would serve two purposes. First, it would put the par-
ties on express notice of their potential exposure. Second, it would
equalize potential inequalities that might exist if the hourly rates by
one party substantially exceeded rates charged by counsel for the
other party. While establishing the same fixed rates for all parties is
only one alternative, courts should be encouraged generally to give
serious attention to the issue of reasonable fees at an early stage in
accelerated procedures to prevent what could become a time-con-
suming satellite proceeding at a later stage.68
D. Proposed Rule 37(h)-Noncooperation With Accelerated Procedures
During Discovery
Accelerated procedures will ordinarily result in compression of
the discovery schedule with the consequent potential for increased
frequency of discovery disputes. In order to encourage parties to
resolve these disputes informally without resort to constant court
supervision, Rule 37(h) requires mandatory payment of attorney's
fees by the losing party in any discovery dispute brought to the
court. New Rule 37(h) would provide as follows:
37(h) Noncooperation With Accelerated Procedures
67 This tracks the comparable requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
68 Consideration of fee petitions in this context could itself become a significant drain
on judicial resources. See, e.g., In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 94 F.R.D. 640
(S.D. Tex. 1982). In International Systems, the defendant moved for sanctions as a result of
the plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery orders. The district court held that the plain-
tiff and his counsel had violated the court's discovery orders, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and basic rules of ethics in connection with the failure to appear at a deposition
and an abrupt suspension of another deposition. As a sanction, the court held the plaintiff
and his counsel liable for additional attorney's fees and expenses connected with the
aborted depositions. A review of the tables set forth in the opinion suggests the considera-
ble difficulties encountered by a court attempting to establish an estimate of reasonable
fees and expenses attributable to the dilalory conduct of the opposing party.
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FAST-TRACK LITIGATION
In any action under Rule 16(f), the party who substantially
prevails in any motion filed under Rule 26(c) or Rule 37(a) shall
recover from the nonprevailing parties the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, incurred in obtaining or opposing the
relief requested.
Courts must be prepared to insist on the cooperation of the
parties throughout the course of accelerated procedures. As noted
earlier, however, the initial good intentions of the parties may not
be sufficient to accomplish this objective. To penalize parties
whose good intentions fade during the course of inevitable discov-
ery disputes, Rule 37(h) imposes mandatory sanctions on the losing
party in any dispute brought to the court. Mandatory sanctions in
the context of discovery are appropriate, because a high percentage
of discovery disputes can ordinarily be avoided if the parties act
reasonably.
1. Comparison of Rules 16(h) and 37(h)
To put the provisions of proposed Rule 37(h) in perspective, it
is useful to compare them with the related provisions of proposed
Rule 16(h), discussed above. First, Rule 37(h) applies only to dis-
covery disputes. Discovery disputes are defined as any motion
brought under Rule 26(c) (for a protective order) or Rule 37(a) (to
compel discovery).
Second, under proposed Rule 37(h), both the moving and non-
moving parties are potentially at risk for paying attorney's fees and
costs. By comparison, under Rule 16(h), only the moving party, if
he does not substantially prevail, can be assessed expenses. Expos-
ing either party to potential sanctions under Rule 37(h) is desirable,
however, because the party instigating the discovery dispute may or
may not be the moving party before the court. In this sense, pro-
posed Rule 37(h) tracks the comparable provisions of existing Rule
37(a) (4).
Third, unlike Rule 16(h), the award of reasonable expenses
under Rule 37(h) is mandatory for all discovery motions. The party
who "substantially prevails" is entitled to reasonable expenses, in-
cluding attorney's fees. Unlike existing Rule 37(a)(4), the test is
not whether a motion was brought with "substantial justification."
Rather, the winning party is entitled to reasonable fees in every in-
stance. Parties who elect to file a stipulation for accelerated proce-
dures will be on notice of these potential sanctions and should
therefore have no grounds to object should sanctions subsequently
be imposed. Without the threat of these sanctions, the efficient
conduct of accelerated discovery could be jeopardized in many
cases.
Finally, also by contrast to both Rule 16(h) and Rule 37(a)(4),
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no hearing is required as a predicate to the award of expenses. The
award is automatic and can be made simultaneously with granting
or denying the Rule 37(h) motion. As with Rule 16(h), the court
should be encouraged to establish, at an early stage of the case, an
appropriate benchmark for awarding fees under either Rule 16(h)
or Rule 37(h).
III. Conclusion
In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in
order to secure for all litigants, "the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action." 69 As our technocratic society has
evolved, however, the volume of litigation and the manner in which
it is practiced have changed dramatically. The current system of
rules promises efficiency and attentiveness to cost, but, in light of
present day litigation realities, lacks the dependable tools to make
good on these promises. Efforts at reform have been made but real
progress has been slow. Moreover, many litigants today would
gladly exchange some of their litigation freedom under the existing
Federal Rules for a guaranteed "back to basics" approach to
litigation.
If ultimately adopted, the proposed fast-track option would
represent a major victory in the overall battle to secure in fact "the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." In
simple and straightforward terms, the proposal seeks to offer liti-
gants a dramatically improved litigation process by ensuring mean-
ingful reductions in both the length and cost of litigation. This
proposal has the capacity to greatly improve the management of
litigation in the federal courts, and we are anxious to begin debate
on its implementation.




Proposed "Fast- Track" Amendments
16(f) Election Of Accelerated Procedures
Upon stipulation of all parties filed in any action within 20 days
after filing of answers to the complaint, the court as provided in
the stipulation shall order accelerated scheduling of such action,
set a date for completion of all discovery, set an approximate
trial date, and make such other scheduling orders as the parties
may suggest. The trial date shall be no later than 12 months
from the date of the stipulation. The election of accelerated
procedures pursuant to this section may not be withdrawn ex-
cept by order of the court for good cause shown.
16(g) Grounds For Denial Of Accelerated Procedures
The court may reject a stipulated election of accelerated proce-
dures only if the court finds that (i) the court's docket cannot
reasonably accommodate such accelerated procedures, or (ii)
the action is too complex to be suited to accelerated procedures
or can be better managed in other ways. Denial of accelerated
procedures under this subsection shall only be made within 30
days of filing of the stipulation, after full hearing.
16(h) Accelerated Procedures-Limited Motions Practice
Parties who elect accelerated procedures shall restrict to the ex-
tent possible the filing of pretrial motions with the court. If any
party filing more than one pretrial motion (other than a Rule
37(a) motion to compel) does not substantially prevail in any
such motion, the court may order such party, after opportunity
for hearing, to pay to the opposing party the reasonable ex-
penses, including attorney's fees, incurred in opposing such
motion.
37(h) Noncooperation With Accelerated Procedures
In any action under Rule 16(f), the party who substantially
prevails in any motion filed under Rule 26(c) or Rule 37(a) shall
recover from the nonprevailing parties the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, incurred in obtaining or opposing the
relief requested.
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